Overly verbose error messages that indicate whether or not a user exists can assist an attacker with brute-forcing accounts. In attempting to harvest valid usernames for a password-guessing campaign, these messages can prove very useful.
Username and Password Enumeration
Within /app/models/user.rb:
def self.authenticate(email, password) auth = nil user = find_by_email(email) # I heard something about hashing, dunno, why bother really. Nobody will get access to my stuff! if user if user.password == password auth = user else raise "Incorrect Password!" end else raise "#{email} doesn't exist!" end return auth end
On lines 9 and 12 you'll notice that the application generates two error messages.
Within /app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb:
def create begin user = User.authenticate(params[:email], params[:password]) rescue Exception => e end if user session[:user_id] = user.user_id if User.where(:user_id => user.user_id).exists? redirect_to home_dashboard_index_path else flash[:error] = e.message render "new" end end
On line 5 you see the exception message object "e" is created. On line 11, the message is displayed.
One of these messages indicates the email address (username) doesn't exist on the system. The other indicates that the password is incorrect. Although the application will render both error messages, either one of the error messages would be harmful by itself. This type of information can be used by an attacker to harvest email addresses or usernames. Once that list is gathered, passwords can be guessed for each account. If the username being enumerated is actually an email address, a phishing campaign could ensue with emails made to look like they are originating from the vulnerable site.
Username and Password Enumeration - SOLUTION
Within /app/controllers/sessions_controller.rb
def create begin user = User.authenticate(params[:email], params[:password]) rescue Exception => e end if user session[:user_id] = user.user_id if User.where(:user_id => user.user_id).exists? redirect_to home_dashboard_index_path else flash[:error] = "Either your username and password is incorrect" #e.message render "new" end end
Although this fix is neither systemic nor does it address the problematic code at its core (within the user model), it does provide a quick solution. On line 12, we comment out the "e.message code" and instead provide a very generic error message that lacks specificity on what credential was incorrectly entered.
Enter an email address that wouldn't likely exist into the login form. Analyze the result.
Can you leverage this to gain unauthorized access?
Password complexity is incredibly important and highly debated subject. Other factors play a part in the stringency of the enforcement policy applied. If a username can be enumerated, a CAPTCHA on the login form is not present or other methods to deter a brute-force password guessing campaign are not in place, at least password complexity enforcement policy can make it a that much more difficult for an attacker to guess users passwords.
Within app/models/User.rb
validates :password, :presence => true, :confirmation => true, :length => {:within => 6..40}, :on => :create
The application validates only the password length and nothing else. Developers can leverage the format option to apply a regular expression that checks the password has sufficient complexity.
Lack of Password Complexity - ATTACK
Leverage a tool such as BurpSuite's intruder to brute-force the passwords of the users. The highest privileged account that you an attacker can compromise is the admin. The password is very simple ("admin1234"), username is ("[email protected]").
Lack of Password Complexity - SOLUTION
This regular expression validates the password has the following requirements:
validates :password, :presence => true, :confirmation => true, :if => :password, :format => {:with => /\A.*(?=.{10,})(?=.*\d)(?=.*[a-z])(?=.*[A-Z])(?=.*[\@\#\$\%\^\&\+\=]).*\z/}
I wonder how strong the administrator's password is?
A timing attack can exist in several forms. This specific case relates to username (email address) enumeration. By leveraging an automated tool, an attacker can review any subtle variation in response times after submitting a login request to determine if the application is performing a computationally intense function. Meaning, if a function is run once a user is discovered, even if the password is incorrect, this information provides the user with valid or invalid usernames.
Within app/models/user.rb
def self.authenticate(email, password) auth = nil user = find_by_email(email) raise "#{email} doesn't exist!" if !(user) if user.password == Digest::MD5.hexdigest(password) auth = user else raise "Incorrect Password!" end return auth end
Ignore for a moment that the application actually tells you whether or not an email address exists :-). Instead, let's look at what would happen if this error message wasn't so specific. Even if the error message vulnerability was mitigated (because it indicates whether or not a user exists), there will be some variations in the application's response between a user that exists and one that does not (however so slight, considering MD5 is in use).
To understand why, let's follow the flow of this code example. Firstly, the application look for a user by email. If not found, nothing else really happens. No further processing, password comparison, etc. If a user is found, we will perform a password comparison and process as normal.
Lack of Password Complexity - SOLUTION
Within app/models/user.rb:
def self.authenticate(email, password) user = find_by_email(email) || User.new(:password => "") if Rack::Utils.secure_compare(user.password, Digest::MD5.hexdigest(password)) return user else raise "Incorrect username or password" end end
To mitigate this attack and shore up our weakness, we do two things. The first is to find a user by email, if they don't exist, create a new user object in memory (not in the database) and assign it a blank password value. This means, regardless of whether or not a user exists, we will have a user to perform some processing on. The next is, we take the input from the user and match it against the user object's password leveraging secure_compare. This is a function (secure_compare) used to ensure that when a comparison happens, it will always take the same amount of time.
In summary, we have ensured that regardless of whether or not a user exists, a password comparison will always occur and it will take the same amount of time to complete.
Timing is everything. Authenticating is important too.